OPENSSL vulnerability

Print Thread

Rate Thread

OPENSSL vulnerability #303860 07/31/2002 4:32 AM
Joined: Feb 2002 Posts: 2,286 England Ian_W Veteran
Ian_W Veteran Joined: Feb 2002 Posts: 2,286 England	If you have your own server, and use openssl, then you might like to know about this. OpenSSL Security Advisory [30 July 2002] This advisory consists of two independent advisories, merged, and is an official OpenSSL advisory. Advisory 1 ========== A.L. Digital Ltd and The Bunker (http://www.thebunker.net/) are conducting a security review of OpenSSL, under the DARPA program CHATS. Vulnerabilities --------------- All four of these are potentially remotely exploitable. 1. The client master key in SSL2 could be oversized and overrun a buffer. This vulnerability was also independently discovered by consultants at Neohapsis (http://www.neohapsis.com/) who have also demonstrated that the vulerability is exploitable. Exploit code is NOT available at this time. 2. The session ID supplied to a client in SSL3 could be oversized and overrun a buffer. 3. The master key supplied to an SSL3 server could be oversized and overrun a stack-based buffer. This issues only affects OpenSSL 0.9.7 before 0.9.7-beta3 with Kerberos enabled. 4. Various buffers for ASCII representations of integers were too small on 64 bit platforms. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2002-0656 to issues 1-2, CAN-2002-0657 to issue 3, and CAN-2002-0655 to issue 4. In addition various potential buffer overflows not known to be exploitable have had assertions added to defend against them. Who is affected? ---------------- Everyone using OpenSSL 0.9.6d or earlier, or 0.9.7-beta2 or earlier or current development snapshots of 0.9.7 to provide SSL or TLS is vulnerable, whether client or server. 0.9.6d servers on 32-bit systems with SSL 2.0 disabled are not vulnerable. SSLeay is probably also affected. Recommendations --------------- Apply the attached patch to OpenSSL 0.9.6d, or upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.6e. Recompile all applications using OpenSSL to provide SSL or TLS. A patch for 0.9.7 is available from the OpenSSL website (http://www.openssl.org/). Servers can disable SSL2, alternatively disable all applications using SSL or TLS until the patches are applied. Users of 0.9.7 pre-release versions with Kerberos enabled will also have to disable Kerberos. Client should be disabled altogether until the patches are applied. Known Exploits -------------- There are no know exploits available for these vulnerabilities. As noted above, Neohapsis have demonstrated internally that an exploit is possible, but have not released the exploit code. References ---------- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0655 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0656 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0657 Acknowledgements ---------------- The project leading to this advisory is sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. The patch and advisory were prepared by Ben Laurie. Advisory 2 ========== Vulnerabilities --------------- The ASN1 parser can be confused by supplying it with certain invalid encodings. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2002-0659 to this issue. Who is affected? ---------------- Any OpenSSL program which uses the ASN1 library to parse untrusted data. This includes all SSL or TLS applications, those using S/MIME (PKCS#7) or certificate generation routines. Recommendations --------------- Apply the patch to OpenSSL, or upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.6e. Recompile all applications using OpenSSL. Users of 0.9.7 pre-release versions should apply the patch or upgrade to 0.9.7-beta3 or later. Recompile all applications using OpenSSL. Exploits -------- There are no known exploits for this vulnerability. References ---------- http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0659 Acknowledgements ---------------- This vulnerability was discovered by Adi Stav <[email protected]> and James Yonan <[email protected]> independently. The patch is partly based on a version by Adi Stav. The patch and advisory were prepared by Dr. Stephen Henson. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.thebunker.net/ Available for contract work. "There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Subject: TSLSA-2002-0063 - openssl From: [][email protected][/] (Trustix Secure Linux Advisor) Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 15:05:53 +0200 To: [][email protected][/] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Trustix Secure Linux Security Advisory #2002-0063 Package name: openssl Summary: Multiple security problems Date: 2002-07-29 Affected versions: TSL 1.1, 1.2, 1.5 - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Problem description: Several severe security problems have been found in the openssl source code which upon the TSL openssl packages are based. Most of these vulnerabilities have a potential for remote expoitation, even though no exploits are currently released. The upstream development group have provided us with patches that fixes the problems. These issues have been asigned the following CVE names: CAN-2002-0655, CAN-2002-0656, and CAN-2002-0659. More information: <URI: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0655> <URI: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0656> <URI: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0659> Action: We recommend that all systems with this package installed are upgraded. Please note that if you do not need the functionality provided by this package, you may want to remove it from your system. Location: All TSL updates are available from <URI:http://www.trustix.net/pub/Trustix/updates/> <URI:ftp://ftp.trustix.net/pub/Trustix/updates/> Automatic updates: Users of the SWUP tool can enjoy having updates automatically installed using 'swup --upgrade'. Get SWUP from: <URI:ftp://ftp.trustix.net/pub/Trustix/software/swup/> Public testing: These packages have been available for public testing for some time. If you want to contribute by testing the various packages in the testing tree, please feel free to share your findings on the tsl-discuss mailinglist. The testing tree is located at <URI:http://www.trustix.net/pub/Trustix/testing/> <URI:ftp://ftp.trustix.net/pub/Trustix/testing/> Questions? Check out our mailing lists: <URI:http://www.trustix.net/support/> Verification: This advisory along with all TSL packages are signed with the TSL sign key. This key is available from: <URI:http://www.trustix.net/TSL-GPG-KEY> The advisory itself is available from the errata pages at <URI:http://www.trustix.net/errata/trustix-1.2/> and <URI:http://www.trustix.net/errata/trustix-1.5/> or directly at <URI:http://www.trustix.net/errata/misc/2002/TSL-2002-0063-openssl.asc.txt> MD5sums of the packages: - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0c51861ce4432c3f669657e2c4971c6f ./1.5/SRPMS/openssl-0.9.6-10tr.src.rpm eb8a64dba138584b8085aec8d9ccaf0c ./1.5/RPMS/openssl-support-0.9.6-10tr.i586.rpm 9db293f035fbd82a3482ab87d3465eb2 ./1.5/RPMS/openssl-python-0.9.6-10tr.i586.rpm 582d08bb63676a33da1aa89a33a05914 ./1.5/RPMS/openssl-devel-0.9.6-10tr.i586.rpm 2d05569684b868cbacca9e389ded3f0f ./1.5/RPMS/openssl-0.9.6-10tr.i586.rpm 96053f774317702af40705697a2460d4 ./1.2/SRPMS/openssl-0.9.6-3tr.src.rpm 84b50e02167b61a9d3093bcc055c7b45 ./1.2/RPMS/openssl-devel-0.9.6-3tr.i586.rpm b0c3b99917e1c69f593a74b9989a33f9 ./1.2/RPMS/openssl-0.9.6-3tr.i586.rpm 96053f774317702af40705697a2460d4 ./1.1/SRPMS/openssl-0.9.6-3tr.src.rpm 111d6f3e42c2410a11ac4704036a31ef ./1.1/RPMS/openssl-devel-0.9.6-3tr.i586.rpm 23d4bef487e86dfff1854f3f3c6fd867 ./1.1/RPMS/openssl-0.9.6-3tr.i586.rpm - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Trustix Security Team -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iD8DBQE9RSsqwRTcg4BxxS0RAgv0AJsGLRMNaZ2pmZdE4NRQCLgfRpNLygCdHfkE 3bFFVLoH4NXOBs+mT/i8T4E= =Ydxh -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Subject: [OpenPKG-SA-2002.007] OpenPKG Security Advisory (mm) From: OpenPKG <[email protected]> Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 15:05:33 +0200 To: [][email protected][/] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ________________________________________________________________________ OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org [][email protected][/] [][email protected][/] OpenPKG-SA-2002.007 30-Jul-2002 ________________________________________________________________________ Package: mm Vulnerability: local root exploit OpenPKG Specific: no Affected Releases: OpenPKG 1.0 OpenPKG CURRENT Affected Packages: <= mm-1.1.3-1.0.0 <= mm-1.1.3 Corrected Packages: >= mm-1.1.3-1.0.1 >= mm-1.2.0 Dependent Packages: apache apache Description: Marcus Meissner and Sebastian Krahmer discovered a race condition on creating temporary files in the OSSP mm library. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2002-0658 [5] to the problem. The bug affects all programs which are linked with OSSP mm. This may allow an attacker to conduct a local root exploit. OSSP mm is often used in Apache setups using mod_ssl and/or mod_php. Here the vulnerability can be exploited to obtain root privilege if shell access to the Apache run-time user is already obtained. Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q mm". If you have the "mm" package installed and its version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it (see Solution). Additionally, we recommend that you rebuild and reinstall all dependent OpenPKG packages, too. [2] Solution: Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release [4], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [3] or a mirror location, verify its integrity [1], build a corresponding binary RPM from it and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary RPM [2]. For the latest OpenPKG 1.0 release, perform the following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases adjust accordingly). $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org ftp> bin ftp> cd release/1.0/UPD ftp> get mm-1.1.3-1.0.1.src.rpm ftp> bye $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --checksig mm-1.1.3-1.0.1.src.rpm $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild mm-1.1.3-1.0.1.src.rpm $ su - # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/mm-1.1.3-1.0.1..rpm Now proceed and rebuild and reinstall all dependent OpenPKG packages, too. [6] ________________________________________________________________________ References: [1] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature [2] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source [3] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.0/UPD/ [4] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.0/UPD/mm-1.1.3-1.0.1.src.rpm [5] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0658 [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.0/UPD/apache-1.3.22-1.0.4.src.rpm ________________________________________________________________________ For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <[email protected]>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by using GnuPG (http://www.gnupg.org/). For instance, pipe this message to the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com". ________________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: OpenPKG <[email protected]> iEYEARECAAYFAj1GjiIACgkQgHWT4GPEy5+dRwCdGCpZ3TCpxh39dB0ZgbieXvLd QiQAoOUJCijAwnAaHGdf/cVC3RhFDISy =LA85 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Subject: [OpenPKG-SA-2002.008] OpenPKG Security Advisory (openssl) From: OpenPKG <[email protected]> Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 15:06:36 +0200 To: [][email protected][/] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ________________________________________________________________________ OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org [][email protected][/] [][email protected][/] OpenPKG-SA-2002.008 30-Jul-2002 ________________________________________________________________________ Package: openssl Vulnerability: denial of service / remote root exploit OpenPKG Specific: no Affected Releases: OpenPKG 1.0 OpenPKG CURRENT Affected Packages: <= openssl-0.9.6b-1.0.0 <= openssl-0.9.6d Corrected Packages: >= openssl-0.9.6b-1.0.1 >= openssl-0.9.6e Dependent Packages: apache apache curl bind fetchmail cadaver imapd cpu inn curl links dsniff lynx exim mutt fetchmail openldap imapd openssh inn perl-ssl links postfix lynx postgresql mutt qpopper neon samba openldap sasl openssh scanssh openvpn sendmail perl-ssl siege postfix sitecopy postgresql snmp qpopper stunnel rdesktop tcpdump samba w3m sasl scanssh sendmail siege sitecopy snmp stunnel sysmon tcpdump w3m Description: According to an official security advisory from the OpenSSL team, there are four remotely exploitable buffer overflows that affect various OpenSSL client and server implementations [5]. There are also parsing problems in the ASN.1 library used by OpenSSL. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the ids CAN-2002-0655 [6], CAN-2002-0656 [7], CAN-2002-0657 [8] and CAN-2002-0659 [9] to the problems. Several of these vulnerabilities could be used by a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the target system. All could be used to create a denial of service. Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q openssl". If you have the "openssl" package installed and its version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it (see Solution). Additionally, you have to rebuild and reinstall all dependent OpenPKG packages, too. [2] Solution: Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release [4], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [3] or a mirror location, verify its integrity [1], build a corresponding binary RPM from it and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary RPM [2]. For the latest OpenPKG 1.0 release, perform the following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases adjust accordingly). $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org ftp> bin ftp> cd release/1.0/UPD ftp> get openssl-0.9.6b-1.0.1.src.rpm ftp> bye $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --checksig openssl-0.9.6b-1.0.1.src.rpm $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild openssl-0.9.6b-1.0.1.src.rpm $ su - # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/openssl-0.9.6b-1.0.1..rpm Now proceed and rebuild and reinstall all dependent OpenPKG packages, too (see list above). ________________________________________________________________________ References: [1] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature [2] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source [3] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.0/UPD/ [4] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.0/UPD/openssl-0.9.6b-1.0.1.src.rpm [5] http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20020730.txt [6] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0655 [7] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0656 [8] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0657 [9] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0659 ________________________________________________________________________ For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <[email protected]>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by using GnuPG (http://www.gnupg.org/). For instance, pipe this message to the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com". ________________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: OpenPKG <[email protected]> iEYEARECAAYFAj1GjigACgkQgHWT4GPEy5+F4wCgu8B6yxJsB6Lu7bygw9FKUAhH 4xsAoKTteo/qotFgoki3JYpuGufyp4vL =k9ol -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Fans Focus - Focusing on Fans of Sport (Okay - mainly football (the British variety at the moment - but expanding all the time....)

UBB.Developers Forums General Discussion Chit Chat OPENSSL vulnerability